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ABSTRACT 
III this paper, we cOllsider lIlimicry, a simple tecfillology 
form of attack requirillg a 10lrer ieFel of expertise 10 
illvestigate whether a speaker recogllilioll system is 
vIIll/erable to mimicry by all impostor Ivit/lOut /Ising (/flY 
assistallce of other ,ecflllOlogies. Experimel/ts all 138 
speakers ill rhe YONO database al/d tH'O people who 
played a role as imitators h(lI'e shol1'l/ thar all impostor 
cal/ arrack the system if that impostor kIlOlI'S a registered 
speaker ill tIle database who has rery similar l'oice to the 
impostor's 1'0 ice. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Biometrics offers greater security than traditional methods 
in person recognition. [n paJiicular, voice recognition 
technology produces relatively low to medium error rate 
and it has a high public acceptance rate due to unobtrusive 
nature [1]. Voice dialing, banking over a telephone 
network, database access serviccs, security control for 
confidential information, and remote access of computers 
are important applications of speakcr recognition 
technology. Reducing the false acceptance error rate of 
impostors has been investigated. Instead, one of the 
biometric recognition tcchnologies, the computer audio­
based speaker recognition system still has a potential of 
security threat cone ems [10][ 14]. 
There have been some reports on impostor attack to 
speaker recognition system. For instance, the sensitivity to 
computer by voice-altered impostor using trainable speech 
synthesis technology and the imposture using synthetic 
speech against speaker verification based on spectrum and 
pilch were investigated [5][8][91. [n those reports, attacks 
arc categorised as organised approach using the 
substitution method. Spcech synthesis systcm is required 
to alter the impostor voice in order to attack the system. 
Howevcr, this may not be practical in an operational 
system where minimum-processing time is required. 
Therefore, in this papcr, we consider mimicry, a simple 
technology form of attack requiring a lowcr level of 
expertise to investigate whether the speaker recognition is 
vulnerable to mimicry without using any assistance of 
othcr technologies. We used a Gaussian mixture model 
(GMM)-based speaker verification system and the YOHO 
speaker database for investigation. 
2, GAUSSIAN MIXTURE IVIODELS 
Let X = {XI, X2 , ... , Xl'} be a set of T vectors, each of 
which is a d-dimcnsional fcature vector extracted by 
digital speech signal processing, Assuming a statistical 
independence betwccn these vectors, the probability of the 
set X given the model A can be calculated as follows 
T 
logP(X I A) '" LlogP(x, I A) ([) 
,=1 
Since the distribution of thcsc vectors is unknown, it is 
approximately modeled by a mixture of Gaussian 
densities, which is a weighted sum of c component 
densities, given by the equation 
r 
P(x,IA.)= LIt";N("'Pj,I;) (2) 
i=1 
where A dcnotes a prototype consisting of a set of model 
parametcrs A == {Il ' Pi, Ii} , It"j, i = 1, ... , c, are the 
mixture weights and N(x1,Pi,I;),i= [, .. . , c,arethed-
variate Gaussian componcnt densities with mean vectors 
Pi and covariance matriecs Ii 
exp� t (x, -Pi)' IiI (x, -Pi )} 
N(x"Pi,Li)= 1f2 1/2 (3) 
(2Jr) ( I i I 
[n trammg the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), these 
parameters arc estimated slIch that in some sense, they bcst 
match the distribution of the training vcctors, The most 
widely uscd training method is the maximum likelihood 
(ML) cstimation. The following re-cstimation formulas are 
used to estimate GMM model parameters [12] 
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T 
L I'(i I x, ,A)( x, - Jii)( x, - Ji;)' 
�=�'�-IL-________________ __ 
I'(i I.I" A) (6) 
3. SPEAKER VERI FICA TION 
Let � be the claimed speaker model and A; be a model 
representing all other possible speakers, i.e. impostors. Let 
P(X I �) and P(X I A,) be the likelihood functions of the 
claimed speaker and impostors, respectively. For a given 
input utterance X and a claimed identity, a claimed 
speaker's score SeX) is used as follows 
SeX) {> 
e accept 
::; e reject (7) 
where e is the decision threshold and the score SeX) IS 
calculated as [I [] 
SeX) = log P(X I AO)-IOg[ � � P(X I Ai)] (8) 
B is the number of background speaker models used to 
represent the population close to the claimed speaker. 
4. EXPERIMENTS 
4.1 Speech Database 
The YOHO corpus was designed for speaker verification 
systems in office environments with limited vocabulary. 
There are 138 speakers, 106 males and 32 females. The 
vocabulary consists of 56 two-digit numbers ranging from 
21 to 97 pronounced as "twenty-one", "ninety-seven", and 
spoken continuously in sets of three, for example "36-45-
89", in each utterance. There are four enrolment sessions 
per speaker, numbered I through 4, and each session 
contains 24 utterances. There are also ten verification 
sessions, numbered I through 10, and each session 
contains 4 utterances. All wavefonns are low-pass filtered 
at 3.8 kHz and sampled at 8 kHz. 
4.2 Speech Processing and Algorithmic Issues 
Speech processing was performed using I1TK V2.0, a 
toolkit [16] for building hidden Markov models (HMMs). 
The data were processed in 32 rns frames at a frame rate of 
10 ms. Frames were Hamming windowed and pre­
emphasized . The basic feature set consisted of 12th-order 
mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) and the 
normalized short-time energy, augmented by the 
corresponding delta MFCCs to fonn a final set of feature 
vector with a dimension of26 for individual frames. 
GMMs are initialized as follows. Mixture weights, mean 
vectors, and covariance matrices were initialized with 
essentially random choices. Covariance matrices are 
diagonal, i.e. [G"k Iii � cr1 and [crk Jij = 0 if i "* j, where at , 
I :::: k :::: K are variances. A variance limiting constraint was 
applied to all GMMs using diagonal covariance matrices 
[II]. This constraint places a minimum variance value 
a'�'ill = 10-2 on elements of all variance vectors in the 
GMM in our experiments. 
Each speaker was modelled by using 96 training utterances 
in four enrolment sessions without end-point detection. 
Error rates therefore were not too low to allow meaningful 
comparisons between the different background speaker 
modelling methods for speaker verification. GMMs were 
trained in text-independent mode. 
4.3 Impostors 
In this experiment, a male and a female were selected to be 
imitators to mimic speakers' voice in the YOHO database. 
Their first language is Chinese and second language is 
English. Both the two imitators have been in Australia for 
more than 7 years. They are both amateur imitators and do 
not have any knowledge of mimicry. They selected a 
speaker in the YOHO database, listened to that speaker's 
voice and speaking style, then they attempt to mimic the 
selected speaker, recorded their voice, save to their 
database and then use that database to t�st the system and 
get the false acceptance error rate using the selected 
speaker as the claimed speaker. 
3.3 Recording Sessions 
Firstly, the imitator was required to naturally speak 40 
utterances with the same vocabulary used in the YOHO 
verification sessions. These utterances were used to 
measure the average similarity scores between the imitator 
and the same-gender subset of the 138 speaker set in the 
YOHO database. Let X be the verification data set of the 
imitator and A; be the model of the ilh speaker in the 
YOHO database, the similarity score was the following 
log-likelihood function 
SeX) = 10gP(X I Ai) (9) 
Based on the 138 scores collected, we chose the closest, 
intermediate and furthest speakers having highest, medium 
and lowest scores, respectively. 
As those target speakers were identified, the imitator 
started recording. For each of the 3 target speakers, there 
were four recording sessions numbered I through 4. For 
each of the four sessions, the imitator listened each of the 
40 utterances of the corresponding target speaker once at a 
time then repeat that utterance with his/her voice and 
record it. We performed the four recording sessions to 
consider the improvement of the imitator's mimicry skill 
after each session. In total, there were 480 (40 utterances x 
4 sessions x 3 target speakers) utterances recorded for 
each of the two imitators. 
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All the recordings were recorded using a high quality 
microphone and saved to 16-bit wave files and sampled at 
8 kHz. The envirolmlent for recording is in a laboratory 
where the system was set up in a corner of the lab with a 
medium to low-level noise from the adjoining rooms, air­
conditioning system, people walking through the corridor, 
and the fan in the SUIl workstation. The same speech 
processing in Session 4.2 was applied to process the 
imitators' voice database. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We used the false acceptance error rate to measure the 
lnimicry leveL The higher the false acceptance error rate 
is, the better the milnicry is. Figure I shows false 
acceptance error rates versus threshold for the female 
imitator (the imitator I). We can see that the error rate for 
session 4 is highest (e.g. at the threshold e= 0.5) since the 
imitator I has 4 times for listening to improve her 
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Figure 1: False acceptance error rates (in %) versus 
threshold for the female ilnitator (imitator 1). 
The three target speakers found for the ilnitator I were the 
speakers 192 (closest), 160 (intermediate), and 146 
(furthest). In Figure 2, the imitator could provide a good 
mimicry. Consider the error rates at the threshold e= 1.0. 
The false acceptance rate obtained by all impostors in the 
YOHO database is 0%, but the imitator could produce a 
false acceptance rate of 5%. If the system is preset to the 
equal error rate threshold, approximately 0.5 as seen in 
Figure 2, then the imitator I could achieve up to 15%. 
This means that if the imitator I logs on as the speaker 192 
to the system preset with e = 0.5, the imitator has 6 out of 
40 times (30%) to be accepted by the system. 
However as shown in Figure 3, if the ilnitator logs on to 
the system as the speaker 135, the imitator I cannot be 
accepted since the false acceptance error rate is lower than 
the average error rate produced by all impostors in the 
YOHO database. A similar result was obtained for the 
furthest target speaker 136. 
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Figure 2: False acceptance error rates (in %) versus 
threshold for the imitator I, all impostors and the speaker 
192. 
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Figllre 3: False acceptance error rates (in %) versus 
threshold for the ilnitator I, all impostors and the speaker 
160. 
For the imitator 2, the three target speakers found were the 
speakers 239 (closest), 151 (intermediate), and 140 
(furthest). A high false acceptance rate was produced by 
the imitator 2 in Figure 4 when he logged on to the system 
as the speaker 140. With the threshold e = l.O, the false 
acceptance rate obtained by all impostors in the YOHO 
database is 0%, but the imitator 2 could produce a false 
acceptance rate of 20%. If the system is preset to the equal 
error rate threshold, approximately 0.5, then the imitator 2 
could achieve up to 35%. 
However as shown in Figure 5, the imitator calmot attack 
the system when he logs on to the system as the speaker 
151. A similar result was obtained for the furthest target 
speaker 239. 
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Figure 4: False acceptance error rates (in %) versus 
threshold for the imitator 2, all impostors and the speaker 
239. 
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Figure - 5: False acceptance error rates (in %) versus 
threshold for the imitator 2, all impostors and the speaker 
151. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have considered the mimicry, a simple teclmology 
form of attack requiring a lower level of expertise to 
investigate whether a speaker recognition system is 
vulnerable to mimicry by an impostor without using any 
assistance of other teclmologies. Experimental results 
showed a fact that a nonnal person can get a high chance 
to attack the syste m if that person knows the closest 
speaker in the database. If that person does not know who 
is closest, but if the speaker database is small and the list 
of speaker names is disclosed, then that person can attack 
the system by using each speaker name at a time to log on. 
Doing this way, the person can find the closest speaker 
and get more chance to attack the system. A notable effect 
is that choosing speakers in the database whom are close 
to the client's voice and use their recording for impostor 
attempts will outperfom1 the re-synthesis they have tried in 
their experiment [4]. 
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